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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
I. introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the two-way relationship be-
tween the size and composition of military forces on the one hand,
and appropriate military strategies for employing them (which includes
not using them) on the other. The rationale of the whole work is that
such a relationship does exist. Given the assumption of a certain degree
of hostility or tension between two nations, one particular pair of force
configurations will render certain strategies inappropriate for either or
both parties, a different pair of configurations will make a different set
of strategies inappropriate. Similarly, given certain strategies and initial
force configurations, some decisions about future force configurations will
be more appropriate than others. The terms "appropriate" and "inap-
propriate" are not meant to convey normative or even prudential weight.
They denote agreement or lack of agreement with a system of certain im-
plicitly assumed goals and a set of technical relations between alterna-
tives means and ends. In other words, they refer to efficient and inefficient
alternatives as presumably perceived by the participants.
The form of the investigation is to begin by characterizing the present
nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This pro-
vides a point of departure for considering a variety of hypothetical
Nom: This study was supported by the Bendix Systems Division, the Bendix
Corporation. Richard Cady of the Bendix Systems Division provided valuable
assistance. But the author assumes full responsibility for the facts, analyses and
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modifications in force configuration. For each modification, a set of
likely consequences on nuclear strategy and further force structure is
predicted. I consider two basic types of modification: first, some arms
control measures; second, the nontrivial deployment of several types of
defensive weapons systems not currently deployed in any significant
measure. Among the arms control measures considered are some general
proposals which have figured in public discussions—a nuclear weapons
freeze, stage 1 of the American plan for General and Complete Dis-
armament, and the proposal suggested by Roswell Gilpatrick in a
well-known article in Foreign Affairs in 1964. Other arms control
measures illustrate certain abstract features which seem of outstanding
importance to the attainment and viability of arms control agreements.
The bulk of this paper is devoted to the strategic implications of the
deployment of defensive weapons systems on a significant scale. I dis-
cuss effects on the balance of nuclear deterrence, the stability of the re-
sulting system of deterrence, and the possibility of superseding a deter-
rence system for maintaining peace by a system of mutual defense. In
my treatment of defensive deployments I utilize the results of the pre-
vious analysis of arms control measures.
Through all the analysis I tacitly assume sets of national goals for the
U.S. and the Soviet Union, which, while not necessarily aggressive, do
result in conflicts between them and, as a result of consequent disagree-
able historical experience, in a nontrivial level of mutual suspicion, dis-
trust and tension. I do not assume that this tension level is constant or
that it cannot be reduced by constructive human endeavor. But varia-
tions in this dimension are deemed to be outside the scope of the present
paper, despite the recognition that arms races and military confronta-
tions may play a crucial role in an over-all dynamic process of emo-
tional-political-military interaction between nations.
if. Relationship of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
(AC and D) Policies to U.S. Nuclear Strategies
A. CURRENT PROGRAMS
Under its current military programs the U.S. is developing a posture
which is designed to be employed with a damage-limiting nuclear
strategy. The U.S. has a multiple of (and considerably more total mega-Strategy, Arms Control, & Systems Deployment 69
tonnage than) the Soviet Union's strategic missiles—more hardened, less
concentrated, and more mobile. Thus, a strategy of controlled response,
eschewing countervalue targets for counterforce targets in early ex-
changes of a central war, while holding back a secure, invulnerable
portion of its strategic attack forces for bargaining purposes, has been
both attractive and feasible for the U.S. Such a policy holds open a
number of options in the actual fighting of a central war, the choice
among which is dictated by the desire to limit damage to the U.S. and
its allies, and to terminate the war rapidly while being able to negotiate
from a superior position. When used first, retaliatory damage to the
U.S. is decreased by its counterforce nature. When used as a second-
strike thrust in retaliation for a counterforce attack by the enemy, it
serves to reduce the potential population damage of a second, and
countercity, attack by the enemy, by being directed against unexpended
offensive forces still possessed by the enemy.
The present strategic posture of the U.S. vis-à-vis the Soviet Union
is not so advantageous that a true first-strike option exists, where an in-
itiating counterforce first strike could weaken the Soviet Union's re-
taliatory forces so that only "acceptable" damage could be done in re-
taliation. The Soviet Union's force level is high enough, and secure
enough, so that great retaliatory damage would be produced in the
U.S. Thus, the Soviet strategic posture is strong enough to deter an
American surprise attack. Besides this, the "partial damage-limiting"
quality of the American strategy presumes for its operational success
that a Soviet first strike would be directed against U.S. strategic weapons
and not populations. A Soviet massive countercity blow would, of course,
abort any subsequent strategic dialogue wherein U.S. superiority could
"win" the war. Since the relative invulnerability and plenitude of the
forces reserved by the U.S. for countervalue targets (in comparison with
the over-all size of the Soviet attack force) is deemed more than suffi-
cient to deter a rational Soviet first strike of any kind—counterforce or
countervalue—this type of eventuality is not to be expected. Yet the
Soviet Union insists publicly that, whether as a first or second strike,
they will hit American (and European) cities. They insist that no self-
imposed, or enemy-induced, scale or targeting restraints can be counted
on to prevail in a central nuclear war. Escalation would be inevitable—
uncontrolled and total. Whether they truly believe this or not is not
clear; but what is much clearer is that they have a rational incentive to70 Strategy and Resource Allocation
assert this publicly whether they believe it or not. Having a considerably
smaller strategic force, specialized in very large weapons that possess far
more countercity than counterforce effectiveness, and which are—and
very likely will remain—somewhat more vulnerable than our own,
the Soviets have apparently adopted a basic strategy of finite deterrence.
They can threaten only countervalue retaliation, but retaliation heavy
enough to make any first strike of ours unprofitable. They must there-
fore establish the credibility of this deterrent by insisting on its counter-
value-targeting. To hint at its operational use for an end for which it is
too small and ill-adapted, is to degrade its deterrent power.
The present over-all balance, then is that of mutual deterrence against
a first strike, neither side having a first strike capability, but the U.S.
possessing a more flexible posture in case of nuclear war—a variety of
options of controlled response to influence the character of the sequence
of strategic interplay during such a war. The availability of these mul-
tiple options during the course of a war, or indeed, the prewar expecta-
tion that such options will be available, is not, however, absolute. It is
conditional on the Soviet Union's willingness to have its operational
strategy influenced by American structuring of its rewards and punish-
ments, or on the prewar American belief that the Soviet Union can be
so influenced. But the apparent asymmetry in American and Russian
military decision-making may be real, and American strategists had
better be more interested in making sure that their strategic model is
empirically relevant than that it is "rational." Thus, the margin of su-
periority of the American over the Russian strategic posture may turn
out not to be a relevant one.
While a deliberate initiation of central nuclear war is mutually de-
terred, it is less clear what else is deterred. Some argue that the strategic
balance acts as an umbrella which "makes the world safe for conven-
tional war." Resort to central strategic exchanges being "rationally" ex-
cluded, neither side believes that the other would escalate to the level,
nor therefore to a just lower level, that would trigger that final escala-
tion, nor to...etc.Thus, limited conventional engagements can be
relatively safely engaged in.
But thisis by no means certain. The issue is the extent of re-
sponsible behavior, and how this extent is subsumed into "rational"
behavior. If a deterrent posture fails, and the enemy initiates a war,Strategy, Arms Control, & Systems Deployment 71
isit rational for the attacked side to carry out its prewar threat of
massive countercity retaliation? Not especially; indeed, especially not if
the enemy has retained further countervalue weapons which he threatens
to use inresponseto retaliation. If the attacked side could be counted
on dependably to back down "rationally" on its deterring threats after
that deterrence fails, then deterrence scarcely exists at all. But deter-
rence does exist in such a prewar posture because the potential attacker
cannot be sure that, when subjected to the crisis of a surprise attack, the
victim will be capable of guaranteeing responsible "rational" behavior.
Psychological studies indicate the breakdown of efficient individual and
group decision-making under extreme stress. Under attack, the victim
may, despite his "best" interests, retaliate uncontrollably. So it is ra-
tional for the potential attacker to anticipate the possibility of "irra-
tional" behavior on the part of his enemy. And indeed, since it makes
deterrence credible, it is "rational" for the potential victim sometimes to
behave, or seem to behave, or be expected to behave, "irrationally."
The same line of reasoning implies that deterrence of surprise attack
may also establish some deterrence of conventional war because, while
"final" escalation is apparently deterred, neither combatant can be sure
how much of a conventional war can be safely engaged in without
setting off an escalatory dynamic that will get out of hand. The strategic
balance does suggest that conventional limited wars will not be substan-
tially escalated with rapidity but only, if at all, haltingly. Thus, con-
ventional wars are not entirely safe, but not clearly unsafe. The lower
the initial scale of hostilities envisaged or the smaller are the stakes in-
volved—i.e., the more limited the war—the greater the likelihood that
the strategic balance will prevent it from getting out of control.
We may generalize. The balance of nuclear deterrence probably de-
ters major provocations of all sorts by both sides, but neither has any
effect on, and may even stimulate, minor provocations—the latter as
long as the elimination of the threat of surprise attack does not itself
substantially decrease international tensions. To the extent that the Cold
War is largely reactive and based on mistrust of the other's intentions,
mutual nuclear deterrence can promote a detente which will decrease
all provocations. It provides a period during which underlying non-
military problems between the antagonists have a better chance to be
resolved constructively.72 Strategy and Resource Allocation
B. FUTURE TRENDS OF CURRENT PROGRAMS
If the present trends of procurement, deployment and strategy are
continued, there is some belief that the postures of the U.S. and Soviet
Union will become less disparate with respect to power. The U.S. may
be willing to see some erosion in its strategic superiority, since a first-
strike capacity will henceforth appear unfeasible; but it will not allow
any substantial erosion to occur. The Soviet Union, on the other hand,
has probably given up on a purely quantitative challenge. It hopes to
offset U.S. superiority through qualitative changes. This introduces the
uncertainities of technological change, with their attendant potentialities
for strategic destabilizing surprises. Responded to by R-and-D ac-
tivity by the U.S., the prospects for a continuing, or even accelerating
trend of qualitative arms race make prediction difficult. All in all, one
might predict an attrition of some of the U.S. options for controlled
counterforce responses. Both nations may find themselves, on the average,
possessing finite deterrence but only finite deterrence—a balance fraught
with instabilities.
C. THE STRATEGIC FREEZE PROPOSAL
I assume this proposal calls for a freezing of the stockpiles of U.S.
and Soviet Union nuclear weapons—warheads and their delivery sys-
tems—at their present levels. This will perpetuate the present strategic
balance which is characterized by greater U.S. flexibility, but with a
difference. While numbers will remain constant, there may exist a pos-
sibility of improving present weapons. New weapons systems will be,
however, forbidden testing or production. Because of the asymmetry
between the postures of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in terms of
strategy and weapon characteristics,itis sometimes argued that the
improvement which may be permissible under the freeze (e.g., in CEP,
reliability, SLBM range, penetration aids, salvo capability) would dif-
ferentially favor the U.S. Thus, the freeze would not preclude the U.S.
from continuing a damage-limiting strategy through controlled response.
It would, if anything, enhance it. Since, if allowed to do so, the Soviet
Union would presumably move in the direction of greater hardening
and dispersion of its missiles, the improved U.S. advantage is not likely
to approach a real counterforce capability.Strategy, Arms Control, & Systems Deployment 73
The impact of these relative postures on various types of deterrence
is likely to be substantially as indicated for current programs.
D. THE U.S. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL,
STAGE 1
This proposal calls for a proportionate 30 per cent decrease in the
level of all strategic weapons, including ABM systems. This would
call for a larger absolute decrease in long-range missiles and aircraft for
the U.S. than for the Soviet Union (in the same proportions as present
U.S. superiority), and a larger absolute decrease in intermediate range
missiles for the Soviet Union. The result is some diminution of Rus-
sia's overwhelming intermediate range missile threat against Europe.
Of the two, the first is probably more significant. The Soviet missile
advantage against Europe is so great that the differential disarmament
here is not likely to alter relative postures appreciably. She will retain
Europe as a hostage against U.S. long-range superiority. On the other
hand, the American long-range superiority, while great in absolute num-
bers, gives the U.S. the opportunity for only a partial damage-limiting
strategy. The significance of even this has been questioned above. The
differential disarmament here can serve to shave further the flexibility of
option possessed by the U.S. While the U.S. probably still could hold to
a controlled response policy, the combination of differential disarmament
and Soviet actions to decrease the vulnerability of its strategic forces, if
allowed, might decrease its attractiveness relative to countervalue strategy
close to the vanishing point. Disarmament appreciably beyond 30 per
cent would quite likely convert the U.S. to a deterrence strategy.
But where the point of indifference occurs is of course very difficult to
gauge and requires highly detailed information.
There is an offsetting factor to this prediction, however. Insofar as
the asymmetry of postures means that permissible qualitative improve-
ments favor the U.S., a damage-limiting controlled-response strategy
will be more securely attractive.
E. THE GILPATRICK LONG VIEW1970
This is possibly the most difficult AC-and-D policy to place in per-
spective, because it is the least well spelled out. It represents a volun-
tary, tacitly agreed-upon, breathing spell in the arms race, taking the74 Strategy and Resource Allocation
opportunity to withdraw weapons systems which are soft or nearly dom-
inated in the armament menu—i.e., weapons not yet obsolete, but which
contribute unstable elements to the over-all confrontation, or whose
effectiveness is clearly secondary even in a diversified weapons mix. In
addition, much of the same self-restraint in procuring and deploying
significantly new strategic offense and defense systems as under the
freeze would be called upon. Over and above this, however, there would
be a budget cut of 25 per cent, reflecting partly the phasing out of soft
missiles, manned bombers and interceptors, and partly the decreased
needs of new procurement as current programs are progressively fuj-
filled.
At first sight, the impact of this policy would seem to be somewhere
between that of General and Complete Disarmament (GCD), Stage
1, and the Freeze. But there are complicating features: the tacitness of
the agreement, the nonproportional force level cuts, the control over
aggregate expenditures instead of individual items.
The tacitness of the agreement introduces an additional strategic di-
mension to policy and also an enviromnental parameter. If one side
acts unilaterally upon a supposed detente, in the expectation that the
other side will follow, is it to the advantage of the other side in fact to
follow? Would such an initiating move by the U.S. be seized upon by
the Soviet Union as an opportunity (since there is no explicit inspection
machinery to be set up) to achieve clandestinely the long-sought catch-
ing-up in strategic strength without openly challenging the superior
productive capacity of the U.S.? Or would the opportunity for genuine
detente be deemed more fruitful? The answer to this question is im-
portant because it throws light on whether or not the environment
under which limited disarmament would be accomplished showed a
significant diminution of tension and mistrust. In an environment of
significantly eased tensions, emphasis by the U.S. upon a damage limit-
ing strategy based on counterforce strikes might seem more active (lead-
ing toward the possibility of a pre-emptive first strike)—and hence
provocative—to the Russians than a purely deterrent strategy. There-
fore,itis not impossible that to preserve the spirit of detente U.S.
policy might shift partly.—and at least overtly—toward deterrent em-
phasis. Any communicated change of emphasis would represent a real
policy change, since an important payoff of damage-limiting strategy,
the establishing of ground rules for restraint in actual nuclear war, re-Strategy, Arms Control, & Systems Deployment 75
quires specific structuring of the enemy's prewar expectations as to how
one intends to fight such a war. And such expectations are created
through the prewar communication.
The nonproportional force cuts, together with an absence of restraint
on research and development, make possible significant transformations
in over-all posture to adapt to the lower force levels. Such transformed
postures could possess greater strategic power than the initial states,
and could shift the strategic balance nontrivially. Insofar as the non-
proportional cuts represent the phasing out of less effective and mote
destabilizing (because soft) weapons systems, the over-all balance will
be more stable despite changes in differential power (the Soviet Union
probably can gain more from this aspect, both because it has fewer
offensive weapons subject to net decrease and because its weapons can
use more additional hardening than those of the U.S.). Insofar as addi-
tional restructuring of force composition occurs, fed by R and D within
the implicit "letter" of the Gilpatrick policy, stability could be seriously
diminished. Choice of U.S. strategy could well hinge on such changes.
Since disarmament targets are expressed in terms of over-aU budg-
etary restrictions for reasons other than the differential elimination
of certain weapons systems already discussed, this adds to the range of
changes which can be achieved in relative strategic power between the
two countries under the Gilpatrick approach. As such, it complicates
predictions about availability and desirability of different strategies.
These three closely related complications may turn out to be unim-
portant. If so, the unmistakable bent of th.e Gilpatrick proposal is to en-
hance the stability of mutual deterrence by decreasing the invulnera-
bility of retaliatory systems and bring the two opposing postures closer
together, thereby leading strategic emphasis away from counterforce
toward deterrence alone. The explicit changes in force composition called
for support this. But the lack of explicit restrictions about some other
composition changes, and the encouragement of improved command
and control, reliability and flexibility, may pull the other way.
F. SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY IN AC-AND-D AGREEMENTS
One must distinguish between equality and symmetry in arms control
agreements. Symmetry need not involve equality of effects, whether it
takes the form of an equal number of each type of weapon to be elimi-
nated by both sides, or an equal percentage. The very fact that it is ex-76 Strategy and Resource Allocation
pressible either in absolute or percentage terms suggests that it differs
from equality of effect. Actually, the ambiguity is greater than this.
Equality of disarmament in absolute or relative terms may lead to
inequality of effect because of the existence of substitutive and comple-
mentary relationships within the compositions of military forces. These
relations operate among the various target-goals, among the various
offensive systems, among defensive systems, and between offensive and
defensive systems. What is an optimal relative composition of systems
at one force level may be suboptimal at a different level. This effect of
force level on optimal relative proportions is likely to be greater the
greater is the diversification of systems within the force. Thus, where
the two arms agreement participants begin with highly dissimilar, highly
diversified force structures, equal absolute or relative changes may
worsen the efficiency of internal force composition for one much more
than for the other. In order to achieve equality of effect, some asym-
metry would have to be provided for in the agreement—either explicitly,
or by stipulating equal disarmament in terms of some aggregate index
of force level (say, the value of the stock and/or military budget) and
allowing each participant to vary its composition as it desires.
Since equality of effect has often been spoken of in terms of equal
numbers of weapons, our argument can be rephrased to say that there is
more than one definition of equality of effect. And this assertion can be
extended further, because equality of effect isin fact a highly am-
biguous concept. It may have any of the following meanings at least:
(1) an equal absolute reduction for the participants in the number of
specific weapons; (2) an equal absolute across-the-board reduction in
all weapons; (3) an equal absolute reduction in an index of force size;
(4) an equal absolute reduction in the ceteris paribus national security
significance of each weapons reduction; (5) to (8) equal proportional
changes in each of the above; (9) reductions that result in equal im-
provement in over-all resource utilization (considering military and non-
military uses of resources: the fulfilment of national security and other
goals); (10) reductions that lead to equal levels of national security;
(11) reductions that lead to the greatest total improvement in the na-
tional security of both participants.
Any of these might be held to characterize equality, although one
could make a good case that the first eight (excluding 4 and 8) represent
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to in the last three. My purpose is not, however, to anatomize the con-
cept of equality but to indicate that only the first eight bear any relation
to the concept of symmetry; and these refer to different conceptions of
symmetry. Only the fully across-the-board reductions (2 and 6) repre-
sent both intra and interforce symmetry. This means that the pursuit of
most of these criteria would entail agreements with certain asymmetric
elements. I have aheady argued above that pursuit of the third or
seventh criteria would entail compositional asymmetries for the partici-
pants, while aggregate force-size reductions were symmetrical. But pur-
suit of the more ultimate criteria (9 to 11) would entail asymmetries
even in the over-all size of force reductions, the more so the greater is
the disparity of initial over-all postures between the participants.
Thus, asymmetrical arms control proposals are not necessarily incon-
sistent with equality of effect. Thus, it is not inconceivable that such
proposals might obtain acceptance by both (or more) participants. Con-
sider, for example, the spirit of the Soviet GCD proposals. By calling for
the elimination of foreign bases and Polaris submarines in an early stage,
and by scaling reductions in arms to achieve an essentially equal final
position, these proposals call for a greater sacrifice of strength from the
U.S. than from the Soviet Union. Yet it is not so much the inequality in
force reductions that makes the proposals unsatisfactory as the inade-
quate provisions for inspection and stability of postures during the
course of disarmament. As long as an essential nuclear standoff is the
alternative to disarmament, so that any power differential between the
contestants is largely irrelevant, an ultimate situation of weapons—and
possibly national security—parity is not obviously unsatisfactory to
either side. Even the erstwhile stronger side loses little in relative se-
curity, yet gains a significantly decreased resource burden in the defense
budget.
We may generalize this. The mutual advantage necessary to a success-
ful arms control agreement requires an approximation to equality of
effect which is typically expressed in terms of symmetrical force reduc-
tion. But asymmetrical reductions may also be mutually acceptable if:
(1) whatever power differentials the initial situation possesses do not
confer decisive advantage to either side, (2) the terminal situation stipu-
lates an underlying parity of security and/or force structure, (3) sub-
stantial force reduction is offered. The last is both the bait that can
offset the antipathy to asymmetrical force reductions, and the reason78 Strategy and Resource Allocation
why asymmetry is needed (since at very low force levels, small absolute
differences would be significant and could be decisive).
Where such proposals are mutually acceptable, the scaling down of
differences would seem to suggest that both sides are satisfied with a
simple deterrence strategy. If adequately safeguarded for stability during
the reduction process, only a second-strike countervalue posture would
be cultivated.
A further possibility should be noted. Agreements providing for large
reductions in force structures might distinguish between offensive and
defensive weapons (in the spirit of some Soviet proposals), stipulating
stringent limits on the former but much more lenient limits on the
latter. Such agreements could radically change the basis of military
posture from deterrence to defense. The loss to both sides of an "as-
sured destruction" capability—the loss of human and economic hos-
tages—is made up by the corresponding ability of each to limit damage
to itself from a first attack by the other. I will discuss below some of the
deeper strategic issues involved in, and the stability of, such postures.
For the present, all I need indicate is that none of the strategies I have
discussed so far, all based on deterrence, would be fully relevant to
this situation.
III. The Deployment of Defensive Weapons Systems
and the Structure of Deterrence
A. WITHOUT ARMS CONTROL
1. Ceteris Paribus Situations. In discussing the effect of defensive
postures on the balance of deterrence without arms control we must
distinguish among three types of situations. One is where one side has
deployed nontrivial packages of active and passive defense systems and
the other has not yet had time to respond: ceteris paribus situations. A
second is where the noninitiator has had the opportunity to react to
the initial deployment, but has chosen to do so without resort to a
defensive package: asymmetric mutatis mutandis situations. The third
is where the response involves defensive deployments as well: symmetric
mutatis mutandis situations. I begin with the first.
Any first deployment of a defensive package imparts an immediate
military advantage to the deployer, regardless of the composition of the
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of the advantage depends on the characteristics of the defense package.
The first refers to the lead time required for procurement and deploy-
ment, and the proportion of this time during which the initiator can
achieve, or wishes to achieve, secrecy about his action. Given equal
initial capabilities on the part of both parties, the higher the values for
the two elements, the larger is the potential military advantage to be ob-
tamed by deploying first; but also, therefore, the greater is the incentive
for the noninitiating party to try to offset this with additions to short
lead-time offensive capacity or an actual preemptive strike. Indeed, a very
high value combination of the two generates instability: neither party
can afford to be second in such deployment. A party engages in deploy-
ment as soon as R-and-D progress promises successful deployment.
There is no mutual deterrence in deployment. The absence of secrecy
reverses this: the longer is the lead-time for procurement and deploy-
ment, and the more visible are its early stages, the greater is the likeli-
hood that each side can wait to see whether the other has begun before
deciding to respond in kind. Shorter lead-times combined with lack of
secrecy require quicker responses, since the noninitiator may reason that
systems which are expected to confer only brief advantage are likely to
by planned for use in that brief period.
Secrecy during the deployment process is thus of real importance in
determining the extent and duration of the advantage conferred by de-
ployment. But secrecy has a different function to play after deploy-
ment. Its worth then depends on whether the defense deployment is
intended more to enhance deterrence or to improve effectiveness in
waging war. In the former context the deploying party wants the other
to know that his weapons will have less impact than he could hereto-
fore expect—and wants him to know this before he decides to use them.
So secrecy here would be dysfunctional. In the latter context secrecy can
succeed intricking the enemy into using unexpectedly ineffective
weapons. It can indeed trick him into starting a war which he might
not have begun if he knew his offensive weapons were going to be
blunted.
The characteristics of the defensive package deployed helps deter-
mine the nature and extent of military advantage conferred, partly
because they determine lead-time and secrecy, and also for reasons to
be noted below. Realistically, given something like present technology,
most elements of a defensive package have long lead-times and are80 Strategy and Resource Allocation
grossly visible. This is most nearly so with respect to ABM for cities,
and fallout- and blast-sheltering, especially the latter, for urban popula-
tions. ABM to protect offensive weapons—airfields and missile silos, for
example—has similar lead-times but is susceptible of greater secrecy.
ASW is probably amenable to the greatest secrecy. Moreover, the lead-
time involved depends on the nature of the technological breakthroughs
that make ASW a truly effective instrumentality. Bomber defense sys-
tems already exist in the posture of both the U.S. and Soviet Union at a
level of effectiveness deemed adequate to meet the prospective bomber
threat. So no important new deployment need be considered.
Thus, in the large, one should expect that first deployment of a de-
fensive package will not give rise to long-lasting ceteris paribus ad-
vantages.
The specifics of deployment will affect what kind of advantage is pos-
sible. ASW, for example, can serve as an adjunct to ICBM in a counter-
force first strike, whether preemptive or otherwise. ABM for hardpoint
defense is a way of decreasing the vulnerability of retaliatory weapons
and therefore enhances deterrence of a first strike. Population-shelter-
ing can improve the stakes for making a counterforce first strike, since
the total damage-limitation impact of the counterforce strike and of
sheltering against a weakened retaliatory blow could reduce the ex-
pected damage from a first-strike policy to a tolerable level. Actually,
sheltering alone (unless it is of the current politically unrealistic blast
variety)is unlikely to have this much damage-limiting effectiveness
against even moderate countercity attacks unless combined with ABM
capacity. Its chief solo effectiveness is likely to come as fallout protec-
tion against counterforce attacks. The combination of fallout-sheltering
of populations with city ABM is a natural one. Each enhances the
effectiveness of the other. Indeed, city ABM without fallout-sheltering
would produce heavy casualties because of the radiation by-products
of its "successful" use, and the possibility of enemy bypass attacks to
waft radioactivity into the unprotected city.
If combined, active and passive city defenses could enhance the
attractiveness of a first strike. But it might also detract from the need
for making a first strike. So long as the nation's retaliatory weapons are
reasonably secure against a first strike, the ability to limit population
damage as well in an enemy strike gives the nation an ability to wait
out a crisis without having to resort to a preemptive strike.Strategy, Arms Control, & Systems Deployment 81
The deterrence effects of such first deployment depend in good meas-
ure on the credibility of the threats that may be made under its um-
brella. With respect to central nuclear war, the key threat is:"If you
attack me, I'll attack you and impose intolerable casualties." It is not:
"If you attack me, I'll attack you and impose greater casualties on you
than you impose on me." The distinction is important. If side A attacks
side B in a counterforce blow, side B must now decide what it should
do. If it should retaliate against side A—instead of perhaps suing for
peace—it would have to expect an additional, and this time counter-
value, blow. Now the difference in expected casualties from such a re-
taliation before and after it has deployed a defense package may be
large enough to convert intolerable into "tolerable" casualties. Country
B would have the incentive with defense deployment but not without
such deployment, to retaliate even after a counterforce first strike by
country A. This retaliatory attack could always be a countervalue blow
unless some alternative target complex promised more effective impact.
So B could threaten in advance of any first counterforce strike by A
that it would surely retaliate and impose damage upon A in the event
of such a strike, because it would have rational grounds for retaliating
even after such a strike.
If A's first strike is countervalue, however, B's subsequent choice is
different. The deployed defensive package having already been em-
ployed to decrease damage in the first strike, the consequences of a
retaliatory strike now would be less affected—if at all—by the presence
of the defense package. Consequently, the presence or absence of de-
fense no longer has as much chance of making the difference between a
rationally justified or unjustified retaliation. Retaliation by B now has to
be threatened in advance on grounds of nonrational loss of control
under crisis—the basic case of deterrence without defense. And the
deterrent effect of the defense package rests on A's belief that the
countervalue damage that it can impose in its first strike will not be large
enough to be decisive because of the defense package.
The defense package decreases the number of hostages to any strike.
But its differential effect would seem to be greater where the initial
aggressor's first strike would leave the other's defensive capability still
essentially intact. Thus, it would appear to enhance deterrence of a cen-
tral nuclear war primarily where the potential aggressor found initiation
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Given the nuclear postures of the United States and Soviet Union at
present and in the foreseeable future, a deliberate first strike against
population centers seems unreasonable indeed. Only an initiating coun-
terforce strike—which at present does not look reasonable either—
would seem at all likely to commend itself "rationally" to party.
So defense probably enhances deterrence of central nuclear war.
Is any other form of deterrence enhanced? In this asymmetric situa-
tion of one-sided defense additional deterrence is possible. Say that
side A is not seen likely to initiate a central nuclear strike but simply a
nonnuclear, but serious, provocation. Side B, possessing the defense
package, may indeed be able to threaten nuclear retaliation on grounds
that its enemy's lack of comparable defenses and its own ability to blunt
an enemy subsequent retaliation would rationally warrant such a nu-
clear first strike as a winning strategy. Such a threat is not incredible.
Consequently, a significant range of non-nuclear provocations—lesser
armed conflicts and threats, and political aggressions—may be deterred
in the ceteris pan bus situation.
Let us examine how this notion applies to the actual situation. Short
of a military provocation technically relevant to U.S. defense, the area
where a military provocation by the Soviet Union would be most likely
to evoke a U.S. threat of central nuclear retaliation is Europe. The situa-
tion of Europe is importantly asymmetrical for the U.S. and Soviet
Union. The significance of Europe as ally or prize, as military asset or
threat, differs for the two. Its differential location the two has
substantial strategic implications. The Soviet Union has internal land
links with Europe; the U.S. requires external, far more distant, sea
links. For the Soviet Union, home-based intermediate and even short-
range weapons have a potential offensive function against Europe; they
do not for the U.S.: only foreign-based intermediate weapons have a com-
parable function. Finally, the relative military postures of the two vis-à-
vis Europe, nuclear and conventional, differ markedly. The Soviet Union
can bring a far more overwhelming attack against Western Europe than
the U.S. and Western Europe can offset or can bring against the Soviet
Union.
One of the problems of the developing strategic nuclear standoff be-
tween the two countries is that if the Soviet Union chose to invade
Western Europe on a large, conventional scale, NATO would not be
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tingent use of Russian intermediate and shorter range nuclear weapons,
not with tactical nuclear weapons either. Under these circumstances,
only a U.S. threat to offer strategic nuclear retaliation might succeed.
But because of strategic nuclear stalemate (parity), such a threat would
not be especially credible to the Soviet, since even a counterforce first
strike could not guarantee only "tolerable" U.S. destruction under a
retaliatory countervalue nuclear strike by the Soviets. The increasing lack
of credibility of this threat to the Soviet Union as they have increased
their assured destruction capability toward "parity" has spread to the
NATO allies. These feel less assured that the U.S. would in fact re-
taliate centrally. A noncentral tactical nuclear response is far less satis-
factory to them, since it makes of Europe a nuclear battlefield. And the
overwhelming Russian nuclear capability in this limited arena would
cause so much destruction as to make a mockery of Europe being "de-
fended". Thus, in both Soviet and NATO eyes the U.S. strategic deter-
rent of limited aggression in Europe is seriously degraded. One response
to this is the French desire for a national nuclear capability whose re-
taliatory use has higher credibility, especially when seen as a trigger to
provoke U.S.-Soviet Union nuclear exchanges and therefore, in some
respects, to enhance U.S. deterrent power again.
In this context, if the U.S. had first deployment of a significant
defense package, it might substantially reestablish an effective deterrent
against Soviet provocation in Europe. It would again make credible that
the U.S. could rationally retaliate even if not directly attacked. Thus, it
could perform a most important function. But we must remember that
the military advantage that confers this virtue is a short-lasting transi-
tional one. After Soviet response has been allowed for, and subsequent
dynamic interplay, the story is quite different. And since defense of
Western Europe is a long-term goal of American policy, it is long-run
deterrence that is wanted. As we shall see below, this may nullify the
profitability of first deployment of a defense package, except insofar as
U.S. long-run interests suggest that a U.S. first strike, made temporarily
tolerable by the umbrella of asymmetrical defense, would be desirable.
So, despite the fact that first deployment would augment deterrence,
its only practical advantage under the circumstances might be to make a
first-strike strategy rational. Moreover, if the Soviet Union duplicated
this reasoning, they would see in a U.S. first deployment of defense,
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They might be driven to desperate aggressive countermeasures, perhaps
even a preemptive nuclear strike. Thus, if the advantages of first de-
ployment are in reality very short lasting, this could impart important
instability into the relative postures. This will be discussed below.
Deterrence against provocations elsewhere is not likely to be much
enhanced by first deployment, even in the short-run. While' expected
damage from a retaliatory interplay might be decreased nontrivially, and
to an "acceptable" level with respect to the goal of defending Europe,
this damage is still enormous by any human standard, and is likely to be
unacceptably high for any U.S. interest less important than Europe (and
probably Latin America). Consequently, the defense deployment would
not markedly increase the credibility of threats relating to lesser provo-
cations. Indeed, it is not likely even to lead to the making of such threats.
One last point. I have been treating the credibility of threats as essen-
tially unitary: whatever an opponent would believe (disbelieve) our allies
would believe (disbelieve) and vice versa. This is probably a good ap-
proximation, but at times significant discrepancies may creep in. The
general closeness of the approximation is due not only to the fact that
both enemies and friends are reading the same objective evidence, but
that each group reads the actions of the other as evidence on how well
they believe certain threats. Thus, the Soviet Union may well read
France's efforts to establish an independent nuclear deterrent as dis-
belief in the threats on which U.S. deterrence depends, and its own
belief in the U.S. threats may be thereby affected (since an ally can be
assumed to be privy to information not available to an enemy).
Discrepancies arise because the information available to allies and
enemies is different. Moreover, the vantage is different, and this intro-
duces a strategic variable. Allies have an incentive to act as though they
believe a threat made by one of them to bolster its credibility for the
common enemy. On the other hand, an ally may act in a way that
appears to be relevant to belief of a threat, but in reality is part of an
attempt to improve its bargaining position within the alliance. A moti-
vation of this sort has sometimes been attributed to the French.
2. Asymmetric Mutatis Mutandis Situations. I can be quite brief,
since most of the basic elements have been treated. The act of deploying
a defensive package will be responded to insofar as the other party ex-
pects it to have military effectiveness or believes that the deployer ex-
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exchange rate greatly favors offense over defense. A reasonable response
may well involve adapting and/or augmenting offensive capacity, with
no attempt to institute a direct defensive capability. Offensive adaptation
includes, for example, retrofitting penetration aids against ABM and
submarine performance changes against ASW. Augmentation includes
simply increasing the number of offensive weapons. Both measures are
designed to offset directly (by saturation or performance or operational
tactics) the defensive weaponry on its own terms and thus replace the
operational effectiveness of the offense to a level comparable to the pre-
defense deployment situation. Since the responding country would wish
to achieve this replacement at a given level of confidence in the face of
an increased uncertainty about actual effectiveness, such would require
an adaptation augmentation objectively greater than what would be neces-
sary to impose the predeployment level of damage.1
A response of this sort has every likelihood of being able in fact to
offset the military advantage imparted by the defense deployment. In-
deed, as suggested, in actual use it would probably more than offset
such advantage. Since under anything like present technology the possi-
bility of such offset seems generally appreciated, a known response in
offensive capability would wipe out the defense deployer's felt advan-
tage. It would cancel out any enhanced deterrence. On the other hand,
for reasons to be discussed below and having to do with uncertainty
levels, even a slightly more than exact offset through enhanced offense
is not likely to establish increased deterrence for the responding country.
The defensive package is likely to increase the threshold of disparity in
military capabilities, which is necessary if the opposing side is to have
significant advantage.
If country A deployed a defensive package, and country B responded
with enhanced offensive capability, the interaction might continue in the
form of an arms race of the same character—that is, a further defense
A qualification is necessary. The enemy's defense deployment raises the cost
of inflicting any given degree of damage on him. Resources available for national
security are not free to the nation: they have as opportunity cost the nonmilitary
resource uses foregone. Since national security and other goals are to some
extent substitutive,a substantial increaseinthe cost of the former relative
to the latter could well induce some diminution in the level of security sought.
This means that the level of assured destruction sought (at given degree of
confidence)—i.e., the extent of direct offset to defense deployment—could fall
below that of the predeployment situation. In the present example, the cost change
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buildup by A, triggering a further offensive buildup by B, and so on.
But this is unlikely. The initial defense deployment would probably
have been associated with R-and-D successes. The temporary advantage
rendered might or might not have seemed worth the expense and re-
sulting postures. But a new significant technological achievement is not
likely to be so conveniently available just in time for A to respond
with a new round. And in the absence of such an achievement, the fact
that a simple extension of measures involved in the first deployment
would have had lesser returns even before B's offsetting response, to-
gether with the demonstration that B could respond advantageously to
offset A's defense (because of the current technological imbalance be-
tween offense and defense), would very likely deter A from initiating a
new round as response. The dynamic interaction unit therefore seems to
be one round at a time. Each round is a new episode, initiated in its own
special terms.
3. Symmetric Mutatis Mutandis Situations. Here it is envisaged that
country B would respond to A's deployment of a defense package by
itself deploying a comparable defense package. In view of the advantage
of offense over defense this kind of response has to be motivated. It is
likely to come about where both countries have comparable defense
technologies available, but where B has been hitherto deterred from
deploying its own defense package by the desire to keep A from such
deployment. Deterrence having failed with respect to A, it now fails for
B as well.
By responding with a defense package, despite the advantages of
offense over defense, B is not committing an irrelevancy. It will be re-
called that one of the options for A which was enhanced by the defense
deployment was a first strike. Insofar as this is so, defense deployment
by B has a direct defensive function: it can save lives in the event of
attack. But there is a deterrent function as well—exactly the same as
for A. If already subject to attack (counterforce especially) by A, the
possession of some population defense, for example, could make the
difference for B between a rational incentive to retaliate and to sur-
render. Thus, its presence will tend to deter A from attack.
But the presence of a defense capability on both sides complicates
deterrence for both. By decreasing the number of hostages subject to
the enemy's attack,it decreases the amount of assured destruction
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creases the ability of each to deter the other's attack. Each has reason to
believe that if it attacks the other, the other will probably retaliate; but
if the first attack is counterforce and one's own defenses are not incon-
siderable, the combination can reduce over-all damage to oneself to
within tolerable limits relative to the possibility of victory. An initiatory
counterforce blow bypasses the enemy's defenses, while one's own de-
fenses function to absorb the evoked retaliation. The enemy's defenses
ultimately enter consideration in that the initiator, having degraded the
enemy's offensive capacity by his initial attack and the absorbed re-
taliation, can obtain victory only by finally threatening a countervalue
blow. The impact of this threat depends on the efficacy of defense
against the remaining offensive capability of the aggressor. If the willing-
ness to terminate the war depends more on one's relative defenselessness
vis-à-vis the enemy at some point in the hostilities, rather than on the
relative casualties so far inflicted—a not unlikely circumstance—then
the mutual possession of a defensive capability can symmetrically
weaken deterrence. The defensive packages on both sides do not simply
cancel one another out; they can operate almost independently to un-
hinge a balance of mutual deterrence (except for the effect of uncertainty,
as will be discussed below).
Indeed, it is partly for this reason that the mutual postures we have
just considered are incomplete. It is very unlikely that B will respond
to A's defense capability simply by deploying its own defense. It will in
addition attempt to offset the enemy's defense, as we saw in the last sec-
tion. It will enhance its offensive capability. And the enemy will simi-
larly respond to the defensive capability induced. Thus, if A deploys a
defense package, B will probably do likewise and augment offense as
well. A, in turn, will offset B's new defense by augmenting its offensive
capability. Thus, a defensive and offensive arms race is the likely out-
come.
The consequences of this balanced interplay differ from the preceding
case. Offensive capability having increased something like proportion-
ally for both sides, and in like form,2 an initial counterforce blow by A
cannot, given approximately the relevant exchange rates obtaining today,
2Likeform is specified—and assumed—because if A augmented offense in
terms of numbers and accuracy, while B solely in terms of penetration against
ABM, a counterforce blow by A would be more effective after such proportional
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reduce expected retaliatory damage to itself much—if at all—below the
level obtaining before any defense deployment, despite the presence of
that defensive capability.
Thus, with additional offense offsetting defense, no degradation of de-
terrence occurs for either side—unless, of course, the arms buildup is
disproportionate for the two (a different case). The result is similar to
the status quo ante in relative strengths, and almost the same in terms of
deterrence. A standoff has been purchased ata higher levelof
armaments—and at great expense—so that in case of war by accident
a higher total level of destruction is possible. Moreover, the dynamics of
such arms procurement can lead to instability, as will be noted below.
The only useful thing which has been purchased is an increased un-
certainty as to outcomes of actual operations. This enhances the sta-
bility of deterrence somewhat, by increasing the margin of superiority
which either side must believe it has in order to be willing to initiate
hostilities. But much the same effect is obtainable by increasing the
absolute level of offensive capability alone. The higher is this level, the
greater the proportion of superiority which one side must possess in
order to be able to initiate a counterforce strike and reduce retaliatory
damage to a preassigned level. Even the stability bought through un-
certainty should not be exaggerated. As long as there are no constraints
on offensive capabilities, the induced augmentation is likely to be great
enough to prevent any very significant increase in operational uncer-
tainty. It is primarily where offensive constraints exist that this may be
an important factor. I shall return to this below.
In sum, where there are no agreed-upon constraints in force struc-
ture, deployment of defense packages can confer short-term advantages
on the initiator—translated in part into primary and secondary deter-
rence—but these are largely or wholly offset when the other side
responds. The most likely outcome is an expensive cancelling-out of ad-
vantage, worsened by an induced dynamic arms acquisition process
which can destabilize whatever balance of deterrence existed before de-
fense deployment began.
B. WITH ARMS CONTROL
The analysis differs if arms control measures are in force. If they are,
defensive commitments come at the expense of offensive options, or at
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paribus case is the same. Onlythemutatis mutandis case must be recon-
sidered.
The situation depends on what kind of arms control obtains. The two
main types for this issue are: (1) limitations on offensive weapons sys-
tems but not on defensive systems (an approximation to a Soviet prefer-
ence), (2) over-all force limitations which allow for substitutions be-
tween defense and offense. (Limitations specifying particular offensive
and defensive force levels would not permit us to consider defensive
force levels as a decision variable for the two participants.)
Under the first, it is not unlikely that a parallel defensive arms build-
up will ensue since, offensive levels being fixed by agreement, every
increment of defense for either side decreases expected damage from a
war (accidental or not). The incremental reduction of expected damage
for each is not undermined by the other's similar defensive additions.
With respect to this factor, then, a defense buildup represents an atomis-
tic, nonstrategic choice limited only by the nonmilitary opportunity
cost of resources.
But a strategic factor does enter in as well. I noted earlier that de-
fensive deployment may have either a defensive or an offensive strategic
impact, or a combination of both. By decreasing its own expected
damage, defensive deployment decreases the other side's basic ingredient
for deterrence. Thus, the parallel defense buildup can be played for
aggressive intent and become an arms race—as offensive in character
as if offensive and not defensive weapons were being acquired. In such
an eventuality the arms agreement itself would be endangered. Thus,
both sides would have to realize that the pace and extent of their de-
fensive buildups were constrained by their strategic valuation of the
offensive weapons arms control agreement. It is likely, therefore, that a
viable, purely offensive weapons-systems limitation would impose in-
direct limitations on defensive systems as well.3
The situation resembles the symmetric mutatis mutandis case without
arms control except that: (1) offensive levels are prevented from rising
This is not to say that such an initial agreement might not be amended
allow for an ultimately complete supersession of defensive posture for deter-
rence. But such supersession is likely to come about by explicit agreement rather
than atomistically or even tacitly, because the pathway involves serious strategic
instabilities. If progress toward the goal is made possible by an easing of in-
ternational tensions, then this is more likely to be brought about by a decrease
in allowable offensive force levels than by an increase in defensive levels. The
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to offset the defensive deployment (2) the mutual defensive buildup can
proceed much further here before being discouraged by arms control
viability and nonmilitary opportunity costs. Together, these mean that
the assured destruction arm of deterrence can be substantially degraded.
Taken by itself, this could be seriously destabilizing, and war might be
initiated before even the telltale warning of a breakdown in the arms
control agreement into upward spiralling offensive buildups. But another
factor assuages this possibility of instability. Deterrence does not simply
depend on what an attacker will lose if he attacks his enemy, but also on
what he will gain by making such an attack. It is a question of the
difference in outcomes between attacking and not attacking. Despite his
standing to lose little by an attack, the attractiveness of such a course
will be weakened as the potential attacker stands to gain less and less.
Parallel defensive buildups decrease the assured gains just as they de-
crease the expected losses. The net effect is not clear.
There are really two effects on the gains from attack: a decrease in
the expected level of destruction to one's enemy, and an increase in the
variance of possible outcomes. Both make a first strike strategy—and a
first strike itself—less attractive. The effect of expected level is obvious.
The effect of variance (uncertainty) is somewhat less obvious, but prob-
ably compelling none the less. For one thing, the simple inability to be
sure of what will happen when the stakes are fantastically high and the
knowledge that what is done cannot be undone and that all humanity
would pay the cost of a miscalculation would seem to exert strong
deterrence against central nuclear attack. For another, there are meas-
ures a potential attacker can take to offset some of the effects of this
uncertainty—reconnaissance capabilities, flexibility of targeting, salvo
capabilities, etc. But all of these are expensive and, under some arms
control agreements of the type I am considering, are either limited in
quantity or are obtainable only by sacrificing the absolute level of offen-
sive capability. Really effective countering of the enhanced uncertainty—
an offensive buildup—is prevented by the arms control agreement.
One may guess at the over-all consequences on deterrence. Both the
expected gains and retaliatory losses from an initial attack are decreased.
But attached to both is an increased variance of outcome. Not only may
one's attack prove to be singularly ineffective but also one's defenses
against retaliation. The increased uncertainty of both work against a
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specffied amount of damage be done to his enemy, and a high prob-
ability (possibly higher) that no more than a specified amount of damage
be done to him in return. Both require overcompensating for variance
—the larger the variance the greater the degree of overcompensation.
Again, the critical constraints imposed by the arms control agreement
prevent effective insurance. One could easily predict that deterrence
against central nuclear war will be enhanced under these conditions:
only extreme inadvertent exacerbation of political tensions would seem
likely to make an attack worth considering.
Much the same would seem to characterize the second type of arms
control—over-all force limitations with substitutability between offensive
and defensive weapons systems. The main difference is that the oppor-
tunity cost of defensive capability is offensive capability. Given some-
thing like present technology, and force levels not very dissimilar from
present U.S. and Soviet levels, not much defensive capability will be
deliberately acquired at the cost of offensive capability. It is possible
that more will be purchased, however, then in the no arms control
situation, since the over-all force level constraint will prevent the oppo-
nent from easily augmenting hisoffensive tooffset any defensive
deployment. Thus, when some R-and-D achievement in defensive sys-
tems promises reasonable performance against the current offensive pos-
ture, a nontrivial acquisition and deployment of a defensive package
may well occur. There is less reason to expect symmetrical (parallel)
defensive deployment by both parties under the present case than under
previous cases. The over-all constraint puts a heavy premium on each
side's relative valuation of the different elements in its posture. The
over-all situation of the U.S. and Soviet Union (resources, relative costs,
differs in important respects. It is likely that they differ
with respect to the usefulness of defense capability. Certainly the past
weapons acquisition experience of the two nations supports this pre-
sumption. Under over-all force level constraints, the Soviets are likely to
buy considerably more defense than the U.S.
The consequences of asymmetric defense deployment will be a pastiche
of effects that we have already considered. The constraints against easy
offset policies will prevent the strategic interplay from cancelling out.
Some decrease in assured destructiveness will be "suffered" by both
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discussed, these may result in a net enhancement of mutual deter-
rence against central nuclear war.
For both types of arms control, we may now ask whether deterrence
against nonnuclear provocation will also be enhanced, as under the
ceteris paribus no arms control situation. It is true that possession of
some defensive capability makes either a first or second strike more
conceivable, and therefore makes it all the more important to prevent
an uncontrolled escalation to the point of central nuclear attack. But such
possession can also be looked on as conferring a kind of insurance
against error. A nation with considerable defense might believe that it
can dabble in non-nuclear provocations—limited wars with some escala-
tion—taking the risk that if it has miscalculated the costs will not be
horrendous. A conservative, essentially status quo power might be more
influenced by the former consideration—that nuclear war is not un-
thinkable to a nation willing to take risks(i.e., to gamble within the
broader sea of operational uncertainty)—and be deterred from infra-
nuclear provocations. An adventurous, but not necessarily implacably
aggressive, nation might be more influenced by its damage-limiting
insurance and be led to probe provocatively. Thus, despite what may
well be an enhancement of mutual deterrence against central nuclear
war, one cannot gauge the effect on deterrence against infranuclear
provocation. The difficulty is not due to the weakness of the over-all
effect, but to the opposing direction of influences of its components.
C. DISTINCTIVE INGREDIENTS OF DEFENSIVE POSTURES
RELEVANTTO DETERRENCE
In my discussion so far I have emphasized the impact of defensive
posturesin reducing the enemy's assured destruction on either a first or
second strike, and for either counterforce or countervalue targets. I have
also emphasized that active and passive defenses are likely to increase
operational uncertainty for an attacker. It pays to examine this a bit
further, and also to discuss briefly some other aspects of defensive
postures which bear on deterrence.
1. Uncertainties for the Attacker. In advance of an attack the p0-
tential attacker cannot be sure how successfully his attack will go.
Compounding the unreliability of his own weapons—which he must
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of active defenses to intercept his weapons, and the ability of passive
defenses to prevent damage from his weapons. At best, he can estimate
only a probability distribution of outcomes—a distribution characterized
by lack of truly relevant experience in its formulation.
Some of these uncertainties can be dispelled after the attack. To do
so will typically require nontrivial investments in specialized resources—
reconnaissance and other forms of intelligence. But some of the un-
certainties are extremely difficult to dispel even after the attack. Destruc-
tion of hidden enemy weapons may remain largely unknown to the
attacker. Even an approximate estimate of human casualties may be out
of the question if the population is sheltered in blast (especially) or
even fallout shelters. Yet knowledge about this destruction after the
attack may well be crucial in determining how the war should be pur-
sued. The ability of the attacker's continuing capabilities to perform de-
pends on such information, regardless of the extent to which the attacker
has perfected continuity of command and control, flexibility of targeting,
salvo capabilities, and penetration aids, as (expensive) adaptations to
a defensive environment.
The existence of these uncertainties substantially complicates the
problem of conducting a successful war. These uncertainties bear on
both initial attacker and defender once the war has begun. But they
bear especially on the potential attacker in deciding whether to start the
war, since that decision rests on the burden of anticipated success. One
would expect the existence of these uncertainties to engender substantial
caution—deterrence——in any would-be attacker.
2. Crisis Management. The role of defense systems in crisis manage-
ment has been treated by Schelling and others. I will briefly refer to
some of the issues in these treatments. The crucial point is that to be
used during crisis situations passive population defense systems must
be activated while active defense systems (and passive weapons defense)
may for the most part remain passive. Fixed or fixed orbiting ABM and
antibomber systems achieve and maintain a state of alert without any
overt change. Manned interceptors, ASW, and airborne alert for stra-
tegic bombers do require an overt change in deployment, but these are
not likely to be the main lines of defense. On the other hand, large-scale
sheltering of populations requires very overt alerting and mobilizing ac-
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of the signaling and communicating with one's allies and enemies that
used to be performed by military mobilization as a whole.
This communication provides a strategic medium for conveying
threats and assurances which help determine the course of the crisis.
As such, it is of real importance for deterrence. The circumstances under
which deterrence is most necessary to prevent war are not isolated periods
of relative tranquility but periods of crisis. Deterrence consists in provid-
ing that even in the midst of crisis the net payoff for making a no-fight
decision will substantially exceed that for a decision to fight. The
dynamics of mobilization have been historically known to turn relative
payoffs suddenly in favor of fighting, even though longer-view con-
siderations presumably favored peace. (World War I may be a case in
point.) So too this public medium for conveying fears, intentions, and
threats, will affect the outcome of crisis just by its very existence, and
despite the intentions of the nations which deploy such defensive sys-
tems. Its use or nonuse is inextricably caught up in the dynamics of
crisis development.
Unfortunately, population sheltering is a crude instrument for such
a function. It is awkward in that so many people have to be mobilized
into unnatural and inconvenient postures. This can be accomplished
only to the accompaniment of widespread and deep psychological alarm
—terror, fear, anxiety. But these emotional states cannot be turned on
and off at will. They have a life and an inertia of their own. Thus, the
defensive weapon of sheltering cannot be used with subtlety as a stra-
tegic tool. Just because of this, leads and lags become important, along
with other dynamic properties possessed by general military mobiliza-
tion in a former era. True, it can be employed to try to allay crisis—by
scrupulous avoidance of use—but even here its nonuse by one side
gives the other side an advantage in using it. Furthermore, in its ab-
sence, other tools of strategic interplay would be employed—it is not in-
dispensable. But, on balance, its existence probably adds a not incon-
siderable element of instability into crisis management.
3. The Defender's Options. One final issue is the impact of defense
capabilities on the options open to a potential defender. In the absence
of such capabilities, if an enemy makes menacing gestures in the course
of a crisis, the current military advantage in being the first to attack
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tacker. In other words, preemptive or even preventive attack looks
more attractive than being helplessly smashed. But this knife-edge
trigger orientation can lead to many—and fatal—false alarms. Both
sides benefit if either can wait to see whether what looks like an im-
pending or already-begun attack is really that.
The possession of significant defensive capabilities provides just such
an option to wait. False alarms, accidental enemy firings, or third-
party "catalytic" firings, can be waited out with little damage and dis-
tinguished from serious enemy hostilities. This flexibility of option intro-
duces an extremely important element of stability into a balance of deter-
rence. If one believes—as quite a number do—that neither the U.S.
nor the Soviet Union has aggressive enough intents to attack the other
just to take advantage of a chink in the armor of mutual deterrence (ex-
cept possibly when in the throes of an agonizing crisis), then the whole
previous analysis of defense and deterrence becomes largely irrelevant.
The most truly relevant issue becomes the problem of accidental or
mischievous, catalytic war. Andis measures like "the hot line" and
the defense-imparted ability to wait out false alarms that most truly
deter central nuclear war. Whatever the relative importance of dif-
ferent elements in deterrence, the present one is considerable in ab-
solute terms.
IV. Defensive Systems and the Stability of Mutual Deterrence
A. INTRODUCTION
I have already considered many of the elements that are included in
an analysis of the stability of deterrence. It will be useful to draw them
together at this time, along with some additional material.
Deterrence refers to a situation where the military capability of one
antagonist and its avowed or implied conditional employment, result
in a situation in which the other antagonist finds a policy of no-fight
preferable to one of fight. The stability of deterrence refers to the range
of circumstances over which the no-fight policy will continue to seem
preferable to the fight policy, the larger the range the greater the
stability. In other words, are not-unreasonably changing events likely to
change an antagonist's no-fight choice?
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circumstance—technological change, sheer quantitative expansion of
force size, force-level reductions and structural changes in the course
of disarmament and other arms control measures, changes in political
goals, etc. My purpose here is to concentrate on the effects of defensive
postures.
B. DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT AND FIRST STRIKE INCENTWES
I have already examined this in general terms. The first antagonist
deploying a reasonably efficient defensive package can experience a
radical change in the incentive to make a first strike in the period before
his enemy has had time to respond. The increase in his damage-limiting
potential can degrade his enemy's deterrence to the vanishing point.
Whether or not a specific nation at a specific time and place, will find
it actually worthwhile to make a first strike depends, of course, on the
specifics of the situation—the efficacy of his defense package, the pre-
cise nature of his and his enemy's military force structures, and the
operational strategies and tactics of the two (and of course the tension
level.)
This potential instability disappears once the enemy has had time to
adapt his forces for a direct offset (through offensive enhancement) to
the defensive deployment. Exact data are not so necessary to justify this
prediction so long as the antagonist is relatively free to change his forces,
and information about approximate weapons performance is available
to both sides. Inadequate, misleading information can make any ob-
jective situation unstable, by leading to miscalculation.4
When the enemy's response to an initial defense deployment is a
similar deployment without offensive augmentation—an unlikely re-
sponse when there is no arms control—there may be a complicated
change in first-strike incentives: both parties may find such a strike
attractive. How likely this is depends heavily on the specifics, as before;
but more, it depends also on the particular goal evaluations of the two
sides. What does each nation hope to obtain through war? What is its
weighing of the various costs of war?
Where arms control agreements exert constraints on force structures,
defense deployments can enhance first strike incentives if they provoke
a defensive arms race, or if they give rise to significantly asymmetric
4Except,as noted above, that when information is known to be inadequate
more caution rather than less is likely to be observed.Strategy, Arms Control, & Systems Deployment 97
postures. I have argued that built-in strategic constraints on defense
deployments under these circumstances are likely to produce configura-
tions where mutual deterrence is enhanced rather than degraded. Spe-
cific empirical evidence (including simulation outcomes) would serve to
demarcate the two types of outcomes.
In sum, our qualitative conclusions support the possibility of instabil-
ity in the very short run, but enhancement of deterrence in a longer-run
perspective in cases presumed to be "normal". Verification, and the
identification of circumstances which conform to these "typical" results,
require empirical observation.
C. DEFENSE FOR OFFENSIVE WEAPONS VS. DEFENSE FOR URBAN
AREAS
Urban areas and strategic offensive weapons can be subjected to both
passive and active defenses—for example, by hardening (sheltering) and
ABM, respectively. Indeed, by locating the two near enough together,
the same ABM systems can protect the two. However, the efficacy of
defense for the two, the feasibility (resource and "human" costs), the
indispensability, the strategic consequences, and the ultimate significance,
diner markedly.
Briefly, offensive weapons are easier to defend both actively and pas-
sively. They can be dug in more feasibly and cheaply; and can be kept
dug in—and alerted—indefinitely (subject, of course, to normal de-
preciation). Populations cannot: shelteringisunnatural and incon-
venient for them; it represents only a temporary, emergency possibility.
Weapons, moreover can be easily and decisively dispersed; populations
cannot be. The way of life, whose protection is after all one of the main
ultimate reasons—if not the main reason—for the whole state of inter-
national tension which gives relevance to military forces—requires heavy
clustering. Moreover, weapons can be expanded in number to whatever
"reasonable" levels are desired; and they are expendable. Populations are
whatever numbers they themselves determine (i.e., prewar); and they
are not expendable. Lastly, the combination of expandibility, dispersa-
biity, and expendability for weapons means that adequate sheltering
and/or active defense are not an indispensable means of defending an
offensive force structure. There is the alternative of proliferation or
dispersal, or mobility or hiding, or combinations of these. In terms of
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The strategic implications of the two differ markedly. Defense of
strategic attack weapons adds to the invulnerability of a retaliatory
force. This has almost entirely a deterrent, not an aggressive, impact.
The defense is most relevant where the enemy has made a counterforce
first strike. It guarantees a larger potential retaliation, and therefore
enhances deterrence against such a first strike. Thus, defense of stra-
tegic weapons, while relatively inexpensive, is also relatively nonpro-
vocative.5
Defense of urban populations can also, as we have seen, be part of
a purely defensive, nonaggressive posture. But by withdrawing a portion
of the antagonist's hostages which form the bulwark of his deterrence,
it could also have the aggressive significance of making a first strike at-
tractive. Therefore, no matter whether intended defensively or aggres-
sively, if international tension is high enough, the enemy will have to
interpret it as an aggressive act for safety's sake, and act accordingly.
This gives it an aggressive significance, whatever its intent. Thus, defense
of urban populations can seriously destabilize mutual deterrence. It need
not under all circumstances, of course, but it may.
A final point on this score is that while the various forms of defense
for retaliatory weapons can be hidden, urban defense is not capable of
much secrecy. So an attempt to avoid the potential instability caused
by urban defense by keeping it covert is almost certain to fail.
Thus, on grounds of both effectiveness (cost) and strategic impact,
defense of retaliatory weapons would seem much preferable to urban
defense. This paradoxical conclusion has another possibly even more
paradoxical implication. To avoid provocation and enhance deterrence,
one should locate weapons away from urban areas, lest the defense of
these weapons (especially active defense—e.g., ABM) be thought to
have a provocative, population defense function as well. Space weapons
are the logical extreme for this kind of reasoning.6
The logic of a deployment of extreme separation between weapons
and ultimate value targets is that these latter have a better chance to
5Itsonly aggressive function is as a protection of weapons held back by an
attacker who wants to be able to follow up his initial attack with a second one.
6Thisis not the only reason for separating weapons location from populations.
Another reason is that if either side finds a first strike attractive it will probably
be a counterforce strike. Separation will tend to minimize the collateral value
damage to any such counterforcefirststrike. Weapons placed in space are
obviously ideal for this purpose. A counterforce war can be fought with no value
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survive under a situation of balanced mutual deterrence without value
defense than under a value defense situation which destabilized mutual
deterrence. Indeed, in the absence of arms control, not only is strategic
instability possible, with its attendant risk of war, but also the defense
deployment is likely to be directly and conveniently offset by offensive
enhancement by the other side. The only situation in which this argu-
ment fails is where an arms control agreement makes possible a lasting
protective function for urban defense. As indicated in an earlier section,
population defense under such circumstances could actually enhance de-
terrence. But the failure of the argument for pure deterrence does not
mean that only urban and not weapons defense would be warranted here.
Indeed, most of the defense procurement would still go to insure the in-
vulnerability of attack weapons. Besides, the alternative argument given
above for separation of weapons from cities would still strongly argue
for such separation.
D. DURABILITY OF DEFENSE
How long does the effectiveness of a defensive system last? This is
relevant to stability because unless the defense can efficiently endure as
long as the threat against it, time will degrade it and change the relative
power of the participants accordingly. The question of durability can be
asked both of a short-run operational period, during which neither of-
fensive threat nor defensive shield can be replaced or augmented, and
of a long-run period during which quantitative and qualitative changes of
note can be made in relative force structures. Both are relevant to some
aspect of the stability of deterrence, but the first is somewhat more im-
mediate. We may compare the durability in both these senses for both
urban and retaliatory weapon defenses.
On the operational period level, possibly the key issue is the move-
ment into and out of, and the continued maintenance of, an alert status.
As indicated above, a significance is imparted because the population-
sheltering component of urban defense requires explicit and cumbersome
mobilization procedures in order to attain and maintain alert status,
while hard-point active and passive defense, as well as the active defense
component of urban defense, do not. Moreover, sheltering is an un-
natural and costly situation for the population. Except for the capital
cost of the installation (which exists for population sheltering as well),
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"unnatural" or costly (but there is an operating cost involved in hiding
submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM]).
There are two implications. First, despite the existence of passive city
defense, a surprise attack might succeed in catching it in a nonalert
status, so that, in effect, it cannot be used to decrease population damage:
it is bypassed. The active defense component would be operative, but
its productivity would be hampered by the bypassing of the comple-
mentary passive component. The prospective decrease in defense effect-
iveness might be sufficient to make a first-strike policy attractive to a
potential attacker.
Second, once a population has been mobilized into shelters—as, for
example, during a serious crisis—it is costly and difficult to keep them
there. There are two types of cost involved. One is the sheer psychologi-
cal strain of living underground in cramped, crowded, unhealthy con-
ditions, lacking in most of the amenities of normal life. Possibly most
important is the high and unrelieved sense of anxiety, fear, terror in-
volved in waiting for the worst to happen where, because of sheltering,
the worst seems imminent. Continued for any length of time, this could
inflict extremely serious psychic trauma. The other type of cost is
economic. Sheltering precludes normal urban economic activity. The
loss of income is directly related to the amount of time economic ac-
tivities are suspended. Thus, maintenance of a state of alert in passive
population defense incurs costs which rise inexorably and probably at
an increasing rate (because of increasing economic start-up costs and
deepening psychic difficulties).
These increasingly burdensome costs of continued alert, in a situation
where an expected attack has failed to materialize, could lead to un-
sheltering before the end of the crisis is reached. A potential attacker,
incurring far less cost in being on offensive alert (as with much of
active defense), could pick just this demobilization to initiate his attack.
Indeed, he has a strategic interest in provoking mobilization and bring-
ing on "shelter fatigue"—or, even more so, in evoking the second if the
first has already come about—in order to take advantage of the resulting
expected unsheltering. The risk, of course, is that the enemy's loss of
patience and defensive readiness may shift the initiative to him: the erst-
while potential victim may become the actual attacker. In any case, the
attrition brought about by sheer duration imparts a potentially unstable
element to crisis management, an element which is lacking in the meas-
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On the long-run duration level the story is different. Here, we are not
concerned with the maintenance of a continued alert, but with the rela-
tive effectiveness of a whole military posture vis-à-vis the enemy's pos-
ture. The nemesis of a given set of measures for insuring second-strike
invulnerability is that the enemy may overtake them by means either of
sheer numerical acquisition or of qualitative changes in his weaponry:
technological change. First-strike weapons may be improved enough
with respect to reliability, accuracy, yield, or production of new effects
so as seriously to degrade a previously effective deterrent posture by the
enemy. A counterforce first strike could succeed in destroying all but an
ineffectual remnant of a once-adequate retaliatory capability.
Urban defense, both active and passive, is subject to just this same
obsolescence through the enemy's technological advance. But it is neither
more nor less subject than offensive systems. A qualitative arms race is
especially charged with unstable episodes, because any set of initial pos-
tures for two parties, whatever the degree of balance between them,
or whatever their internal composition, can be transformed into an
unbalanced situation in which one or both parties have a military
incentive to attack the other. This is not a flat prediction of actual
instability, but recognition of a probability distribution for which the
probability of zero potential 8instabilityover an extended period with
unconstrained R and D is very, very low.
Thus, in terms of short-run operational durability, the prospects for
a stable balance of deterrence are affected by whether urban defense
is or is not deployed in addition to weapons defense. In terms of long-
run durability, these prospects are a function of technological change,
and do not depend in advance on the type of defense chosen.
V. Deterrence vs. Defense
A. THE TRANSITION FROM DETERRENCE TO DEFENSE STRATEGY
Given anything like present technology, the only situation where a
defensive, rather than a deterrent, strategy could be viable is where a
substantial defensive capacity buildup proceeded under the umbrella of
mutually agreed limitation on offensive power. Such a mutual posture
A"military" incentive to attack is not necessarily a net incentive, since the
over-all level of tension, the conflicts separating the parties, may change in an
offsetting direction during the same period.
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would have the attractiveness of making a first strike unprofitable and
any unintended or third party firing of little effect. The deterrence felt
might be weaker than at present, but, in hostilities, damage levels and
risks of escalation would be far lower.
Transition from a deterrent to a defensive strategy is complicated by
their basic incompatibility: effective defense by one side degrades the
possibility of the other's deterring attack through offensive retaliation.
One cannot have an adequate deterrent while the other has an adequate
defense. Thus, movement toward defense strategy can only succeed if it
is parallel for the two.
A parallel defensive arms race is largely similar to an offensive race
in that both sides competitively seek to reduce retaliatory damage to an
acceptable level. Here too differential achievement can lead to strategic
instability. But there are differences. First, unlike offensive races, even
nondifferential achievement can lead to instability, since both sides may
have simultaneous attractive first-strike options. In offensive races, of-
fensive weapon is pitted against offensive weapon, so only one side at
most can predominate over the other. Here, defensive weapon is pitted
against offensive weapon, so it is possible for defense to predominate
simultaneously for both sides without either having an over-all differ-
ential advantage. This source of instability may not be serious, since
inflicted damage falls along with sustained damage. Willingness to attack
probably depends on a relationship between gains and costs, not on
costs alone.
A second difference is that the defensive race is viable only in the
context of agreements limiting offensive weapons. Either or both sides
may strategically choose to break the agreement as a response to a
grossly disadvantageous development of the defensive race. This pos-
sibility of lumpy escalation serves to set limits to differential advantage
within the race and introduce a distinctive form of instability.
B. TYPES OF DAMAGE AND DAMAGE LIMITATION AND THE
COMPATIBILITY OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE
Up to now I have tacitly assumed that defense referred either to de-
fense of weapons or defense of populations. Defense of urban areas rep-
resented an attempt to defend populations efficiently, by taking advan-
tage of their clustering. While installation of hard-point defense had
relevance mostly to the enemy's calculations about first strike desir-
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tion. By removing one's own population from the status of human
hostages, the defense-deployer could paradoxically jeopardize that very
population. It was for this reason that I considered deterrence and de-
fense orientations incompatible in spirit.
This assumption in effect categorizes targets into only two classes.
But there is a third type of target, and its existence may importantly
revise my judgment. Populations are not the only kind of target deemed
to represent the nation's ultimately valued elements. Economic resources
are also prized, complementarily with human beings. Indeed the situa-
tion of humans without economic resources is hardly deemed more
worthwhile then the situation of no humans at all. Moreover, the issue
of many international conflicts concerns augmentation, protection, or
use of a nation's economic base.
To some extent, consideration of economic resources does not change
the analysis. An important portion of these resources is clustered along
with populations in urban areas. Defense of these areas is partly a de-
fense of both. But even here there are differences. While active de-
fense may protect both, fall-out sheltering will protect populations but
not production facilities located in cities. The disparity is even more
striking for resources located outside urban areas. Industries located in
small towns and rural areas cannot economically be defended. Much
more important is agriculture. Agriculture can be almost completely hos-
tage to enemy action with high yield, extremely dirty nuclear weapons,
and no economically feasible defense against such targeting exists under
presently foreseeable technology. Only highly efficientantiliftstage
weapons could be relevant, and these do not seem to be in the offing. In-
deed, even if they were, they might not be the strategic weapons chosen
for acquisition and deployment.
What this means is that even the massive defensive superiority en-
visioned in the previous section does not completely withdraw all useful
value targets from under an enemy's retaliatory sights. Massive destruc-
tion of the arability of land may not have the immediate dramatic impact
of huge human casualties, but the enormity of the loss would become
apparent as existing food and material supplies became depleted. And
the hopelessness of a human future under such circumstances would
approximate—might even exceed—that of heavy human losses. The
30—50percent human decimation of the Black Death in Europe was
after all supportable since it left resources intact (indeed, agricultural
productivity even rose as a result). But catastrophic destruction of such104 Strategyand Resource A ilocation
resources destroys the springboard from which the human spirit can
spring back.
Highly prized values would therefore remain as targets even though
a heavy defense buildup for populations took place. Offensive weap-
onry, if adapted to the new type of target, and without necessitating
substantial augmentation, could still maintain deterrent power. This
means that large-scale defense deployment would not have succeeded
in changing basic strategic orientation away from deterrence to defense.
It would simply have changed the relative attractiveness of different
types of targets. The prospective payoffs that help create the conflicts
which wars are called upon to settle, and which help to define victory
and defeat in such wars, would remain hostage to offensive power
despite heavy defensive commitment; thus, one is again led funda-
mentally to question the rationale behind a resource allocation to large-
scale defense such as I have been discussing.
Finally, these considerations strike a chord that has been struck again
and again throughout my study. In order to answer complicated ques-
tions, I am forced to go back to raise some very elementary questions.
What are the issues that are likely to lead to wars? What are the aims
that will be followed in carrying out such wars? Are they abstract aims
like destroying the enemy, or doing him more damage than he does you,
or minimizing your own damage? What kinds of damage are impor-
tant? What are the trade-offs between different types of damage? Or are
the aims of war instead more closely associated to the concrete aims
that engendered the crisis and war? Are they some combination of the
abstract and concrete? One may even have to ask: When the carrying out
of hot or even cold war becomes terribly onerous, how does one side,
or both, get out? What is the value of losing a given struggle in order to
be able to extricate oneself from it, in order to resume a larger con-
test in a more favorable arena? How does a participant communicate
such considerations?
These questions do not refer solely to the problem of defense. They
are relevant here because they are relevant to broader problems of over-
all strategy; and if any single conclusion should follow from my entire
discussion, it is that the techniques, the worthwhileness, the consequences
of various defensive measures—the very significance of defense—relate
intimately to strategic considerations of the broadest scope. I am not
speaking of one egg in a basketful—I am speaking of the hen herself.